On August 15, 1971, Richard Nixon imposed the first and only peacetime wage and price controls in U.S. history. The Nixon tapes, personal tape recordings made during the presidency of Richard Nixon, are now available to the public and provide a unique body of evidence to investigate the motivations for Nixon's macroeconomic policies. We have uncovered and report in this paper evidence that Nixon manipulated both monetary and fiscal policies to create a political business cycle that helped secure his reelection victory in 1972. Nixon was very kno wledgeable about economic matters and understood the risks to the economy of his macroeconomic policy actions and the imposition of wage and price controls, but chose to tradeoff longer-term economic costs to the economy for his own short-term political ga in. JEL Codes: E6; E3; E58
Introduction.
Over thirty-years ago, William Nordhaus (1975) initiated the literature on the opportunistic political business cycle, the idea that politicians regardless of their party affiliation try to maximize their chances for reelection by creating favorable economic environments in the run-up to elections. If operative, the opportunistic political business cycle should yield economic fluctuations that follow the election cycle. Nordhaus' work has spawned hundreds of papers, but support for his hypothesis has been far from unanimous. Alesina, et al. (1997) , for example, report that the opportunistic model does poorly in explaining economic fluctuations in many countries. More recent work points to party-specific evidence for political business cycles (for example, Kraus and Mendez (2005) and Bloomberg and Hess (2003) ).
The Nixon tapes, personal tape recordings made during the presidency of Richard
Nixon, are now available to the public and provide unique evidence to investigate the existence of an opportunistic political business cycle. We have uncovered and report in this paper evidence that Nixon manipulated both monetary and fiscal policies to create a political business cycle that helped secure his reelection victory in 1972.
Nixon's New Economic Policy.
On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon, a self-proclaimed Republican "Conservative,"
1 announced the first and only peacetime program of wage and price controls in U.S. history. The wage and price control program was part of Nixon's New Economic Policy (NEP), a set of fiscal and regulatory actions designed to take aim at the 1 Nixon tape conversation No. 607-11. problems of unemployment, inflation and international currency speculation. 2 The NEP called for the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold, a temporary tariff surcharge of 10 percent on all imports, a tax credit for investing in new equipment, the repeal of a 7 percent excise tax on automobiles and an accelerated schedule for increasing personal-income-tax exemptions. In addition to these expansionary fiscal policies, the president was simultaneously working to ensure that monetary policy would become increasingly expansionary (Abrams, 2006) . Table 1 provides background data on unemployment and inflation leading up to NEP. Over the previous two years, the unemployment rate had risen steadily, increasing from 3.5% to 6%. While the inflation rate moderated somewhat over the two-year period, it remained at 4.4% for the twelve months ending July 1, 1971. Phase I of the wage and price control program, initiated on August 15, froze wages and prices for 90 days. In November, Phase II was launched empowering a Pay Board and a Price
Commission with authority to approve wage and price increases. The President confidently predicted that continued support for his economic program would cut the inflation rate in half. 3 Nixon proved to be a very poor economic forecaster. During the next four years, 1972-1975 , the inflation rate surged to an average annual rate of 8 percent.
The NEP, in conjunction with the highly expansionary monetary policy, produced the expected increase in aggregate demand and output that was needed to reduce unemployment. During 1972, real output increased by 7.7% and the unemployment rate dropped from 5.9% to finish the year at 5.2%. In such a stimulated economy, did the President and his policymakers believe that temporary wage and price controls would be sufficient to tame inflation? Or were the decisions to impose wage and price controls made for purely short-run political gain?
Herbert Stein, a member of the Council of Economic Advisors in August, 1971 , recalls the rationale used by some in the Administration to justify the price and wage controls: "The theory was that the inflation then underway (about 4% per year) was
propelled by expectations of inflation, not by underlying demand and supply conditions.
The 90-day freeze would shake those expectations, and then the economy would subside into price stability." 4 Thus, one possible line of thinking was that the aggregate demand stimulation would take care of the unemployment problem and the temporary wage and price controls would take care of the inflation problem.
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An alternative justification for temporary wage and price controls relies on opportunistic political behavior. At the time of the wage and price freeze, Richard
Nixon's presidential re-election bid was less than fifteen months away. Any political gains that might be made in the run up to the election from reducing unemployment might be negated if the inflation rate accelerated. Temporary wage and price controls would convenient ly disguise inflation until after the election.
Were temporary wage and price controls implemented and maintained in the runup to the election to break inflationary expectations or were they the product of political
opportunism?
In what follows, we report on relevant conversations that provide an answer to this question. Nothing stays flat as you well know. "
PRE-FREEZE CONVERSATIONS.
Nixon: "It always moves."
Connally: "It always moves."
Since they did not believe that they could hold unemployment and inflation to their desired levels, the most important objective was to drive them down just prior to the 1972 election.
Importantly, Connally expresses his concerns abut the international situation and the balance of payments deficit. This issue will prove to be the tipping point that pushes
Nixon to favor wage and price controls. Friedman warns against using monetary stimulus to try to reduce nominal interest rates or unemployment. He observes that monetary policy was on the right course through January but has become inflationary. He welcomes an internationa l crisis that would necessitate floating the dollar.
Friedman: "I'm not optimistic because you cannot avoid a rise in interest rates in the next six months…I don't know a thing about politics. But it does seem to me that nothing could be more damaging to you in 1972. Shultz and Connally argue that rising nominal rates in the face of a rapid monetary expansion reflect strong real demand (income effects). Burns counters that lenders are asking for higher rates due to inflation. Burns feels inflation is rising and suggests energetic action on the wage-price front and a halt to fiscal expansion.
Burns: "You know I care more about unemplo yment than inflation… "
Connally: "I'm more concerned about the inflation than I am unemployment."
Based on previously revealed preferences, these two statements would be more credible if reversed.
Connally: "I would say some time between now and a year from now you're going to have to impose some kind of a freeze or a wage-price control."
Connally again suggests controls and will ultimately succeed in influencing Nixon Nixon wants a story leaked through Colson about a recommendation to expand the Federal Reserve Board. Nixon also wants a second rumor to be leaked.
Nixon: "In view of the fact that the President has responsibility for full employment, the President is considering legislation to … the Fed has got to be brought in the …"
Haldeman: "in the executive branch. "
Nixon: "The independence of the Fed…"
Haldeman: "is seriously in question. "
Nixon and Haldeman discuss two pending vacancies on the Federal Reserve Board.
Nixon: "We're going to fill 'em both with basically easy money men. "
7 Taping began while this conversation was already in progress. Connally's presentation of his "program" is lost, although it is likely similar or identical to the program he discusses at length on August 2, 553-6.
Haldeman: "George (Shultz) said both he and Connally are under orders from you to find the easiest money man in town. "
Nixon is now conspiring to do an end-run around Burns to get the expansionary monetary policy he desires.
July 26, 1971 (546 -2) Nixon and Assistant to the President for International
Economic Affairs Peter Peterson.
Peterson discusses the deterioration in the balance of payments and the high rate of unemployment. He asks for authority to work in top secret on a bold approach with an August announcement. Nixon recommends speaking to Connally and Peterson replies that he and Connally have discussed his ideas.
Nixon: "I've never seen anybody beaten on inflation in the United States. I've seen many people beaten on unemployment."
Friedman's earlier advice about the political costs of reviving inflation has had no impact on Nixon whose primary concern is reducing unemployment. When Nixon took office the unemployment rate was 3.3%. After efforts to reduce inflation resulted in a recession in 1970, unemployment rose to 6% and stubbornly remained there. As stated above, Nixon preferred a 5% rate. Nixon begins with criticisms of Burns and then turns to discussing industries with high wage-price push.
Nixon: "It seems to me that on a rifle-shot basis, symbolic, you could get in and do those, and then basically then you do have an incomes policy. …. Just do some stuff for symbolism? "
Nixon wants the public to think he is doing something about inflation, but his only real concern is unemployment, so a symbolic action against inflation is enough.
Connally lays out his pla n for closing the gold window (the institutional arrangement where foreign governments are permitted to convert dollars into gold at a fixed rate), floating the dollar exchange rate, placing limits on Federal spending, imposing a 10%
tariff, a 7% investment tax credit, a cut of the excise tax on oil and a 90-120 day freeze on wages and prices.
Connally then appeals to Nixon's leadership desires.
Connally: "It ought to show the people that you have both an awareness of the problems that (garbled) in both the domestic and international field and show secondly and most importantly that you have the courage to face up to it. That you take a position before you're forced to take a position. "
Nixon has doubts about the plan which they discuss. Connally reports that
Peterson supports the plan as does McCracken. The plan apparently is not fully supported by Shultz who is present and by Burns who is not present.
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Connally wants to keep meetings secret from Burns (a major source of leaks, they believe). They discuss timing. Connally wants to act sooner and Nixon later. Connally's concern is an impending run on U.S. gold reserves.
Nixon: "We must not talk to him [Burns ] until we've decided we're going to do it, because he will talk."
Connally: "I know it." Connally knew his plan would stimulate the economy and that wage and price controls were the only way to keep inflation from increasing. He went on to argue that a psychological break was needed, and a freeze would provide it.
This August 2 meeting appears to be the key meeting that launched the NEP.
Haldeman notes in his diary (1994, pp. 335-6) All the tapes this day discuss Connally's plan. Nixon, the man who only a few days earlier said that wage and price controls would cause a "terrible smothering of the free economy" and were "a scheme to socialize America" is now prepared to impose a wage and price freeze as part of a bold plan to tackle domestic and international problems facing the economy. Connally reports that Burns fears that Treasury is moving to take over the Fed.
Connally told Burns it was not his goal. Nixon firmly supports the Connally plan for the New Economic Policy. Now the remaining decision is timing. Nixon claims that "..the best time to do it is the day after Congress gets back."
Labor Day was September 6 and Congress was in recess through September 8.
Looking forward, Shultz tells Nixon that something will be needed following the freeze.
August 12, 1971 (7 -112) Nixon and Connally in a telephone conversation.
Connally states that he expects another bad day at the gold window and that we are "constantly losing the initiative". The reference is to the drain of gold from official reserves due to the conversion of dollars into gold. 9 The initiative that is being lost refers to the plan to close the gold window. He and Nixon discuss how to calm the international situation. They refer to the domestic part (freeze on wages and prices and import tariffs) and international part (closing the gold window and floating the dollar). The y discuss the options of accelerating both or just one part and speculate as to what would do the most to calm the international situation.
Nixon: "I know that the cleaner way to do it is to do it all in one bundle, uh, et cetera.
But, uh, if we're going to have to move our timetable up and uh try to explain all this thing you know, that's a hell of a hard thing to explain to people."
Nixon is leaning toward doing the domestic part first, and Connally agrees, but this may just be a strategic decision on Connally's part to agree with the President.
August 12, 1971 (273-20) Nixon, Connally and Shultz.
In spite of Connally's urging earlier that day to accelerate the program due to an impending international crisis, Nixon expresses his desire to call Congressional leaders back on September 7 and announce the program then. Connally agrees that waiting until September 7 is the wise thing to do but they cannot wait because they have lost over $3.6 billion of reserves during the first twelve days of August.
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9 Haldeman (1994, p. 340) records that "…the British had asked for $3 billion to be converted into gold. If we gave it to them, other countries might follow suit. If we didn't, they might wonder if we had enough gold to support the dollar. In either case, it was a major crisis." 10 Connally anticipates that Monday (August 16) was going to be a very bad day.
Later, Connally predicts that closing the gold window will not be the main focus of public attention.
Connally: "To the average person in this country this wage and price freeze -to him means you mean business. You're gonna stop this inflation. You're gonna try to get control of this economy. …If you take all of these actions…you're not going to have anybody…left out to be critical of you. "
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A few minutes later Nixon agrees to accelerate the program.
Nixon: "I think we ought to go Monday [August 16, 1971 ] with the whole ball."
Later in the meeting Shultz suggests moving to Sunday night. This possibility is discussed briefly, but no change is made at this time.
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August 13, 1971 (563-6) Nixon and Haldeman.
Haldeman writes (1994, p. 340) that "As a result of last night's decision on the economic move…" a meeting was scheduled beginning that afternoon with the President, the Quadriad and other economic and political advisors at Camp David.
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The tapes reveal concern about leaks from Peterson and especially Burns.
Haldeman asks Nixon if he intends to keep everyone "up there" and away from
Washington until Monday. They discuss possible times to request TV time for the President's speech. It is clear that on Friday afternoon the announcement was still planned for Monday night.
11 Regardless of his economic knowledge, Connally's political skills are impressive. 12 Unfortunately, the tape quality is particularly poor at this point and the conversation becomes unintelligible. 13 During conversation 273-20 (above) Connally recommends not revealing at the Camp David meeting that a decision has been made and conduct the meeting in a way that everyone feels that they are part of the decision. Connally tells Nixo n that he had watched all three channels and CBS had done a great job. Connally quoted the CBS correspondent: "This is the domestic visit to Peking."
Nixon is now being applauded for both his domestic and international initiatives. Planning for the post-freeze period is a major topic. Burns voices his opinion that the freeze of Phase I should be followed by a thaw-a gradual transition to restoring freemarket pricing. Burns also indicates "we've got to have some sanctions" in Phase II.
Nixon says "I think the thaw idea is quite intriguing. Nixon: "They'll spend more."
Friedman: "They'll spend more. The same danger with the Fed. When it sat down, it could print more. Now from your point of view and our point of view, we want to look forward, not only to '72, but beyond that. We don't want, we all want a victory in '72, but we don't want a victory which has to be followed by a course of action that puts the Nixon: "Uh, huh. "
Friedman: "Because Congress will not be able to, I think, prevent from spending and we'll have a whopping [garbled] deficit. And if the Fed monetizes that deficit and increases the quantity of money at anything like the way it did in the first six months of this year, I'm afraid that the scenario I've described is inevitable."
Nixon: "Well, let's just hope we don't convince Arthur to do it too soon. " (Friedman laughs).
Nixon is worried that a tight monetary policy applied "too soon" would adversely affect the employment picture prior to the election. Shultz and Nixon express concern that the Fed had engaged in monetary "contraction" in the previous month. Friedman asserts that the month-to-month money supply numbers are not very meaningful and assures them that a robust economic recovery is underway. Friedman predicts that unemployment will not be a problem for the 1972 election and restates that the real problem is to keep the money supply growth in the 4-5 percent range so that inflationary pressures will not build up. The President is in possession of a memorandum from Connally, Shultz,
Later in this conversation
McCracken and Stein for their Phase II proposal. Connally informs the President that prior to reaching their decision that everyone was given an opportunity to speak their minds. If there was no consensus, the group planned to take a formal vote, but this was apparently not needed. The four men had all agreed that once the President decided on a policy for Phase II the President's decision would "bind us all."
The proposed goal of bringing inflation down to 2 to 3 percent by the end of 1972 is discussed. Nixon, who previously acknowledged that price and wage controls would not work, worries about the consequences of failing to meet the goal. Connally craftily tells Nixon that the onus of achieving the goal of 2-3 percent will not be on the President, but rather on the Pay Board. If the goal is not met, the President can "take them on" and "set new standards."
The President worries about the unions and wage contracts that had previously been agreed to, but were deferred as a result of the wage and price freeze. He fears labor will strike if these contracts are not honored. Connally suggests that these deferred increases in wages be permitted and taken as a "lump." These would be permitted before the end of 1971 and wouldn't go into the statistical computations for 1972.
Consequently, Nixon is told, the wage increases wouldn't adversely affect achieving the goal of 2-3 percent inflation by the end of 1972. The President is also told by Connally that the wording of the goal is to achieve an inflation rate of 2-3 percent by the end of 1972. The election at the beginning of November gives the President "a little bit of running room" because there will still be 60 days to go before assessing whether or not the goal was achieved. Thus, Phase II was constructed so that the President would be blameless if the wage and price controls failed to achieve their goal.
October 7, 1971 (10-121) Nixon and Burns on the White House telephone. Nixon will address the nation that evening and announce the plan for Phase II.
Nixon: "Hi, Arthur."
Burns : "Good morning, Mr. President."
Nixon: "You were in New York yesterday so I didn't get a chance to talk to you. But I wonder if (senior White House speechwriter) Bill [Safire] has talked to you yet?"
Burns : "Yes, he has."
Nixon: "Great, Great."
Burns : "And I've made a few minor changes in language."
Nixon: " I wanted you to check the language."
Burns congratulates Nixon on reaching a quick decision on Phase II and voices his strong support.
Nixon: "As you know, they did bend to your wishes on setting the target of 2 to 3
[percent per year for output prices]."
Later in the conversation,
Nixon: "As a safeguard, I will ask the Congress [for standby controls on interest rates].
Now, that doesn't bother ya?"
Burns: " No, no. Mr. President, I don't think you have much of a choice."
The two men discuss the likelihood that Congress would insist on some interest rate controls to go along with wage and price controls. concern that John Connally played a role in sabotaging Burns' pick for the Board.
Elsewhere in the conversation, Shultz and Nixon discuss the latest inflation statistics.
Over the previous twelve months, the inflation rate was 3.5 percent. Shultz points out that the year-to-year number will fall going forward (as wage and price controls were now in place). Nixon and Shultz discuss problems with the operations of the Cost of Living Council and the Price Commission. Nixon firmly claims: "I am totally committed to getting rid of both of them." Obviously, he was referring to some time after the election.
Nixon and Shultz also discuss a letter from Milton Friedman that apparently took aim on the Fed's already expansionary monetary policy. They are concerned that this might influence Burns to retract his promise to further increase the growth rate for the money supply. With Phase II set to operate through to the election, Nixon now focuses his attention on keeping Burns to his word about delivering on the money supply (Abrams, 2006) .
Concluding Remarks.
The Nixon tapes clearly indicate that Nixon cared little about inflation and was most concerned about unemployment: "I've never seen anybody beaten on inflation in the United States. I've seen many people beaten on unemployment." Wage and price controls, in his words, would produce at best a "cosmetic" effect and at worst "a terrible It is said that just because you're paranoid, it doesn't mean they aren't out to get you. Similarly, just because you have inflationary expectations it doesn't mean they aren't rational. Given the inflationary policies of the Nixon Administration, "s.o.b."
George Meany and the AFL-CIO seem to be the ones with rational expectations. Nixon noted that labor gets "too cocky" at an unemployment rate around 3 percent. Given that the unemployment rate hovered near 6 percent, wage-push inflation was not an issue, at least in Nixon's mind. The hypothesis that wage and price controls were imposed to break unwarranted inflationary expectations receives little support in the Nixon tapes reviewed here. Rather, wage and price controls were born out of political expediency and persisted due to their political popularity.
While Nixon was initially reluctant to accept the wage and price freeze, he soon turned into an enthusiastic supporter: "As a matter of fact, I'd like the freeze on right through the election." He worried that Phase II's goal of a 2-3 percent inflation rate by the end of 1972 would not be achieved, but the design for the program was such that Nixon could plausibly deny responsibility for any failure. However inefficacious Nixon thought wage and price controls would be, they satisfied his political imperative to "give the idea that we have a plan, that we know what we are doing…and we're going to do it."
The following excerpt from a personal email received from Milton Friedman on September 25, 2006, offers his insights into Nixon's wage and price controls:
…Nixon worked in the Office of Price Administration during World War II and got a very negative opinion of price and wage control so in principle he was strongly opposed to wage and price controls. But as we all know, Nixon had the capacity of rising above principle if politics demanded it.
My explanation of why he adopted price and wage controls… hinges on the crisis in foreign payments and the gold market that developed in the summer of 1971….The obvious solution was to close the gold window, that is to say, to end the agreement by the United States to provide gold on demand at the fixed official price. However, if the President did nothing else but simply close the gold window, he foresaw that he would get all sorts of negative publicity; he would be called the negative President; he shuts down; he doesn't open up, etc. So he yielded to the suggestions of John Connolly [sic] that he offer a major program of stopping inflation of which one part would be closing the gold window and another part would be the imposition of price and wage control. Connolly argued that he could sell that proposal as a far-reaching imaginative proposal instead of as a simple negative reaction to pressure from outside.
In short, had there been no gold crisis, I believe there would not have been price and wage control on August 15, 1971. …I met with Nixon only once after August 15, 1971. On that occasion he emphasized his own distaste for wage and price control and assured me that they would get rid of them.
The tapes support Friedman's interpretation. Treasury Secretary John Connally faced an impending crisis resulting from balance of payments deficits and loss of gold reserves. He persuaded a reluctant President to suspend gold convertibility by combining the suspension of convertibility and floating of the exchange rate with a package of policies intended to stimulate the domestic economy and hopefully reduce the stubborn rate of unemployment. Connally correctly foresaw that the public would pay far greater attention to the domestic changes, especially Nixon's bold approach to fighting inflation by imposing wage and price controls, than to the international changes.
Richard Nixon arguably remains most remembered for the infamous Watergate burglary and subsequent cover-up that led to his resignation, but his manipulation of macroeconomic policy in the run-up to the 1972 election proved far more damaging to the nation. The recessions that were needed to break the Nixon-induced inflation cost the country hundreds of billions of dollars, redistributed enormous amounts of wealth from creditors to debtors and raised the risk premium in financial ma rkets for years to come.
Surely, the costs to the nation of the Watergate burglary and subsequent cover-up were minor in comparison. 
